The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core (Kóczy, 2007) .
1 use the pessimistic recursive core (Kóczy, 2007) and show that this coincides with set of order-independent equilibrium coalition structures as produced by
Bloch's modified model.
Studying the relation of noncooperative models and the core is not new (Chatterjee et al., 1993; Lagunoff, 1994; Perry and Reny, 1994) . Most of the work is, however, focussed on TU-games and therefore ignore externalities. Moldovanu and Winter (1995) study NTU-games, which often exhibit similarities with games with externalities; their work is both the source and motivation for this paper, where we extend their results to games in discrete partition form (Lucas and Macelli, 1978) . Huang and Sjöström (2006) independently established a similar, or, rather, the reverse result modifying the model of Perry and Reny (1994) . Here the order of players is not fixed, order independence is not an issue, the focus is on stationary subgame perfect equilibria and show equivalence to the r-core (Huang and Sjöström, 2003) for totally r-balanced games (a condition that corresponds to our assumption of non-empty residual cores).
The structure of the paper is as follows. After the introduction of Bloch's model, we explain the two aforementioned objections. The third section contains our modified model. Then we present the recursive core and finally our main results.
Preliminaries
Let N be a set of players. Subsets are called coalitions. A partition π of N is a splitting of N into disjoint coalitions. Π S is the set of partitions of S ⊆ N with π S denoting a typical element. The game (N, v) is given by the player set N and a discrete partition function (DPF, Lucas and Macelli, 1978) 
where v i (π) denotes the payoff for player i in case partition π formed. For
A rule of order ρ is a strict ordering of the players. Let ρ(S) denote the player ranked first in the set S.
3 Sequential coalition formation
A game of sequential coalition formation (SCF) (v, ρ) (Bloch, 1996) is defined by a DPF v and the rule of order ρ. It is played as follows.
1. Start at the highest ranked player.
2. The current player makes a proposal. A proposal affects a coalition S of players.
3. The following player in S gets the word. He can either reject the proposal, become the next proposer and the game continues at step 2. Alternatively he can accept the proposal and the step is repeated.
4. When all players in S approve, the coalition forms and these players exit.
If all players exit the game terminates, otherwise return to Step 1.
In the original model a proposal is a coalition of players: when all accept the invitation, the coalition forms and leaves the game. In the following we slightly modify the game and allow a proposal to be a partition of S, that is a set of coalitions. This model represents an improvement over the original one in at least two respects. Bloch (1996) In the following we formalise the model. 3 Strategy σ i of player i is a mapping from H i to his set of actions:
where 
Definition 2. A subgame-perfect equilibrium σ * is a strategy profile such that
Definition 3. A stationary perfect equilibrium is an subgame-perfect equilibrium profile that is also stationary.
The coalition structures that emerge as subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies are denoted by SECS (v, ρ) . Then we have the following:
Proof. In case SECS(v, ρ) = ∅ the result is trivial. ∈ Cα(N, v) . Then there exists a coalition S such that for some partition π S ∈ Π(S) we have
Otherwise let π ∈ SECS(v, ρ) and assume that π /
Now consider the corresponding deviation for the stationary perfect strategy profile σ * for which we have π = π(σ * ). Consider a deviation by the member i of S who has the first chance to speak: if the set of players who have already left the game is K, then K∩S = ∅. Suppose that this player rejects any ongoing proposal and suggests π S to form. As before, π(π S ) denotes the coalition structure formed in case the proposal π S is accepted. We write π(
denotes the partition that remaining players form following σ * together with the partition π K that has already formed. Then the payoff of player i ∈ S would
.2. Therefore the deviation is accepted by other players in S and hence π / ∈ SECS (v, ρ) . Contradiction.
Hence π ∈ Cα(N, v).
It is easy to verify that core stability CC (N, v) introduced by Shenoy (1979) is equivalent to the following: The coalition structure π is not core stable if ∃ a coalition S ⊂ N and partitions π S ∈ Π(S) and
Therefore core stability is neutral to allowing players to propose partitions.
Proposition 2. Let v be a valuation such that CC(N, v) = ∅ and for all restrictions v of v to R ⊂ N we also have CC(R, v ) = ∅. Then for any rule of order ρ we have CC(N, v) ⊆ SECS(v, ρ).
The proof is analogous to the proof of Bloch (1996, Cor. 3.5) . The following corollary gives a similar sufficiency condition to lemma 3.4 by Bloch (1996) on the nonemptiness of the set of stationary equilibrium coalition structures. 
Corollary 4. Let v be a valuation with CC(N, v) = ∅ and for all restrictions
4 Recursive core Kóczy (2007) generalises the core to partition function games; here we adapt his pessimistic version (and hence drop the adjective in the sequel) to DPF games.
Definition 4 (Residual Game). Let R be a subset of N and π S a partition of its complement S. The residual game (R, v π S ) is the DPF form game over the player set R and with the DPF v π S :
The residual game is a discrete partition function form game and in the recursive core the same solution is used to solve this game as the original one.
Before defining the core, please note that as the partition uniquely determines payoffs, instead of imputations or payoffs, the core consists of partitions.
Definition 5 (Recursive core). The definition consists of four steps.
2. Inductive assumption. Given the definition of the core C(R, v) for every game with |R| < k players we define dominance for a game of k players.
, the set of partitions.
3. Dominance. The partition π is dominated via the coalition S forming
The partition π is dominated if it is dominated via a coalition.
4.
Core. The core of a game of k players is the set of undominated partitions and we denote it by C(N, v).
For a discussion about the various properties see Kóczy (2007) .
Results
The core is a static concept: once a core partition is attained, it is never abandoned. It does not, however, offer a recipe, or even a proof of the possibility to attain such a partition. In this section we establish the relationship between the core and equilibrium coalition structures of the modified version of Bloch's noncooperative game of coalition formation.
Stationary equilibrium coalition structures
First we relax the sufficiency condition for the nonemptiness of the SECS.
Proposition 5. Let (N, v) be a DPF form game such that C(N \ S, v π S ) = ∅ for all residual games (N \ S, v π S ). Then C(N, v) ⊆ SECS(v, ρ) for all ρ.
Proof. The proof is inspired by that of Bloch (1996, Proposition 3.2) in part, and is by construction. We show that ifπ ∈ C(N, v) there exists a stationary perfect strategy profileσ =σ(K, π K , τ ) such that π(σ) =π.
6
Let π(τ ) denote the partition that the acceptance of a proposal τ ultimately produces. In the DPF form game π K , as a deviation defines a residual game
The "harsh response" to π K is an elementπ N \K of the (by assumption non-empty) residual core C(N \ K, v π K ) ensuring that the deviation
The stationary strategyσ i for player i is then constructed as follows:
In equilibrium π(σ) =π and the strategy is stationary by construction so we only need subgame perfection. We show this by induction. As subgameperfection holds for a trivial game we may assume that it holds for all games of size less than |N |.
Now consider game (N, v) and observe the following. If a set of players K
have left the game to form π K the subgame is simply a coalition formation game with less players. Moreover, the proposed strategy exhibits the same similarity property: in equilibrium the core partition is proposed and accepted, while residual cores form off-equilibrium. The minimality condition then ensures that the off-equilibrium path is subgame perfect so we only need to check whether a deviation τ is ever accepted. This deviation corresponds to a deviation in the DPF game. Sinceπ ∈ C(N, v) , by the construction ofπ N \K we know that there exists a player in S for whom the deviation τ is not profitable. Finally observe that we do not use a particular rule of order.
Lemma 1 and this result provide an upper and lower bound (in terms of set inclusion) on the modified stationary equilibrium coalition structures.
This result has the following consequence:
Then for any rule of order ρ, SECS(v, ρ) = ∅. N, v) this corollary weakens the condition in Corollary 3.
Order-independent equilibria
We show that the order independent equilibria (OIE, Moldovanu and Winter, 1995, p.27 ) coincide with the recursive core.
Definition 6. (Moldovanu and Winter, 1995, p.27 ) A strategy profile σ is an order-independent equilibrium for the SCF game (v, ρ) if for any rule of order ρ 1. σ is a stationary, subgame perfect equilibrium in (v, ρ)
We denote the set of order-independent equilibria by OIE(N, v) and partitions resulting from playing such equilibrium strategies by OIP (N, v) .
Before proving this theorem we prove two auxiliary results. Proof. The proof is based on the proof of Proposition A by Moldovanu and Winter (1995) and is by contradiction. N, v) . Then there exists a coalition S such that a deviation π S ∈ Π(S) is profitable in the cooperative game for all assumptions about the residual game (N \ S, v π S ). In this game of nonempty residual cores this implies
The restriction of an OIE to a subgame is also an OIE, which, by our assumption belongs to the recursive core of the corresponding cooperative game. Therefore if deviation π S forms in the noncooperative game, the resulting coalition structure is π(π S ) =
. By our arguments for the cooperative game Consider another j ∈ S and assume that after j's approval of π S the partition forms and S leaves the game (either j is the last player to accept or the rest is known to approve). We show that it is optimal for j to approve. A rejection by j makes her a proposer and the strategy profile (σ i , σ −i ) is played.
If, from here, no coalition ever forms, but the game goes on forever, the payoff for j is 0, which is clearly inferior as 0 < v j (π(π S )). Then assume that coalition T leaves the game first, forming partition π T . Consider the part of the game from j's proposal until T 's departure. If i becomes the proposer again, by stationarity, the game goes on forever without a coalition forming, contradicting our assumption that π T forms. Therefore i is never a proposer. But then i's deviation is never played and playing
By the assumption that σ is an OIE playing it in (v, ρ) or (v, ρ ) results in the same payoffs, which, by Inequality 5.6 are inferior to accepting proposal π S .
Finally note that i s deviation is limited to the game while all players participate. The game after the departure of a coalition is unaffected; in particular if j / ∈ T , j's payoff is unaffected by i's deviation giving the same conclusion.
We have discussed all cases and found that j's refusal is never optimal. By backward induction the proposal is accepted by all players in S and then, by Inequality 5.6, i benefits from the deviation. Proof. The stationary-perfect equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 5 is unconditional on any rule of order ρ. On the other hand, it produces the same coalition structure,π for each rule of order ρ. It is therefore also an OIE. Such an OIE is constructed for eachπ and therefore the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 8. The proof is by induction. The result holds for trivial, single-player games. Assuming that the result holds for all k − 1 player games, the result for k-player games is a corollary of Lemmata 9 & 10.
Conclusion
Theorem 8 states that the core coincides with the order-independent equilibria of the SCF game. This result is not so surprising considering that a similar relation has already been established for characteristic function form games without transferable utility (Moldovanu and Winter, 1995, Corollary 2.) . Huang and Sjöström (2006) show the converse result for their very similar r-core concept (Huang and Sjöström, 2003) with a modification of the continuous-time coalition formation process of Perry and Reny (1994) : While order-independence is part of this process by definition, establishing stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium coalition structures is no easy task.
While these results bridge the gap between the cooperative and noncooperative approaches, one question remains, which is the relation of equilibrium strategies and equilibrium coalition structures. Here we have shown that coalition structures produced by order-independent equilibria coincide with the recursive core. Whether the same would hold for partitions that can be produced by equilibria for any rule of order, remains an open question.
Seemingly a small technical detail, it has some rather profound effects on the game. When the equilibrium coalition structure belongs to the recursive core it is also supported by a strategy profile where the initial proposer proposes the entire coalition structure and the others accept. Therefore "sequential"
is reserved for off-equilibrium behaviour. For SECSs outside the core such a proposal may be rejected.
Finally note that this model does not punish for delay: if a player is "disinclined" to make the equilibrium proposal one can define a stationary equilibrium profile where the right to initiate is passed around a bit before the equilibrium partition is proposed. Delay can of course arise in more general forms, too.
